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Abstract: Since Eveland and Shah (2003) published their seminal study on the 
impact of social networks on media bias perceptions in the US, little has been 
researched about the interpersonal antecedents of hostile media perceptions. In 
this study we address this gap by investigating the role of safe, or like-minded, 
political discussions on individuals’ likelihood to perceive media as hostile. 
We use survey data from more than 5,000 individuals in Germany. Our findings 
reveal that like-minded discussions increase one’s likelihood to perceive media 
as hostile; yet, only among those more politically engaged and ideologically on 
the left. The significance and theoretical implications of the results are discussed 
in the concluding section.
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1  Introduction
Time and time again, US president Donald Trump accuses the media of biased 
news coverage: “Well, I think the press makes me more uncivil than I am […] I’m 
a very intelligent person. […] I really believe the press creates a different image 
of Donald Trump than the real one”, he told journalists in October 2017. Whether 
Trump is intelligent is not for us to determine, but the president certainly is not 
alone in perceiving media coverage as distorted. Extensive research shows that 
citizens tend to perceive the news media as biased against their own viewpoints 
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(Chaffee and Mutz, 1988; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt, 1998; Giner-Sorolla and 
Chaiken, 1994; Mutz and Martin, 2001; Vallone, Ross, and Lepper, 1985).
Understanding hostile media perceptions is a major task for many reasons. 
Gauging the role of audiences’ reactions and perceptions to mediated political 
messages is especially relevant in current segmented and partisan media envi-
ronments, where opportunities to self-select political content have prolifer-
ated (Feldman, 2011). Explaining perceptions of media hostility is also relevant 
because they have been linked to highly relevant political attitudes and behav-
ior: decrease of trust in media and political institutions (Hansen and Kim, 2011); 
increased feelings of isolation (Mutz, 2002), anger and lowered political efficacy 
(Tsfati and Cohen, 2005), reluctance to express views (Hwang, Pan, and Sun, 
2008), and political mobilization, by way of triggering corrective actions designed 
to change a perceived hostile status quo (Rojas, 2010).
Are some citizens more likely to perceive the media as hostile than others? 
Are all individuals’ hostile perceptions equally affected by their peers? Previous 
research has shown that Republicans in the US are more prone to distrust the 
media or perceive hostile media bias than Democrats (Lee, 2005; Mutz and Martin, 
2001), especially when they discuss politics with like-minded peers (Eveland and 
Shah, 2003).
Much less is known about the impact of political discussion on perceived media 
bias among people with different political preferences and attitudes outside the 
US context. The US is a very particular case since public perceptions of a liberal 
media bias have been the object of heated discussions among politicians, polit-
ical pundits, and journalists for decades (Eveland and Shah, 2003; Strömbäck 
and Dimitrova, 2006; Watts, Domke, Shah, and Fan, 1999). In this study, we draw 
on individuals surveyed by the German Longitudinal Election Study in 2013 (N= 
5,353). The larger significance of the German case is illustrated by several features 
of its media structure. Like most western European democracies, Germany has 
a strong public-service broadcasting system that adheres to values of political 
balance and neutrality which spill over into private TV channels (Reinemann, 
Stanyer, & Scherr, 2016). Power-sharing political systems like Germany’s are the 
norm in the majority of European countries, and hold the potential for enhancing 
people’s perceptions of media representativeness and inclusiveness (Nir, 2012; 
Wessler and Rinke, 2014) while also contributing to familiarizing citizens with 
differing (and by extension more hostile) political views.
In this paper, we argue that being embedded in like-minded or safe polit-
ical discussions reinforces individuals’ political predispositions and decreases 
their willingness to tolerate political disagreement. The result is an increase of 
perceived ideological gaps between one’s surrounding social networks and more 
distant and heterogeneous media environments, which are perceived as politi-
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cally hostile (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004). Those more activist and 
partisan individuals should be more prone to perceiving such gaps since they 
tend to be more passionate about their political beliefs and to judge information 
more defensively (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1994; Gunther and Liebhart, 2006; 
Vallone et al., 1985).
Our study has also focused on the impact of ideology on media bias per-
ceptions. Departing from mixed evidence on the impact of pre-existing politi-
cal views on tolerance towards incongruent information and perceptions of an 
opinion climate (Huckfeldt, 2001; Mutz and Martin, 2001; Sidanius, 1985), we ask 
whether leftists or rightists are more or less likely to experience media as hostile. 
We rely on a series of ordered logistic regression models with perceived hostile 
media bias as dependent variable, safety of political discussions and left-right 
self-placement as well as strength of party identification as independent varia-
bles of theoretical interest. Results show an interaction effect between safety of 
political discussions and ideology. Not only do those more engaged, partisan, 
and leftist individuals experience hostile bias perceptions in greater numbers but 
also their discussions within like-minded networks is more positively correlated 
to perceived hostile media bias the more leftist an individual is. Additionally, 
we find evidence that more politically sophisticated individuals tend to perceive 
media as hostile when talking to people with whom they agree. The results com-
plement previous US findings and highlight the importance of both individual 
and situational characteristics in explaining perceived media bias.
2  Perceived media bias, interpersonal  
communication, and ideology
Hostile media perceptions (or HMP) have long been object of study among com-
munication scholars. Since Vallone et al. (1985) conducted their seminal experi-
ment to test what they called a hostile media phenomenon among pro-Israeli and 
pro-Arab students, a wide array of studies have investigated how people on dif-
ferent sides of a policy issue perceive neutral media coverage as hostile (e.  g., 
Gunther and Schmitt, 2004; Schmitt, Gunther, and Liebhart, 2004). As Weeks, 
Kim, Hahn, Diehl, and Kwak (2019) note, perceptions of hostile media bias are 
particularly puzzling considering that previous meta-analyses did not find strong 
support for the assumption that news media favor one political camp over the 
other. However, both encounters with completely balanced information on any 
political issue or people judging news coverage in exactly the same way are rel-
atively rare (Arlt, Dalmus, and Metag, 2019). In other words, outside of the lab, 
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citizens might be making substantially different media choices (Goldman and 
Mutz, 2011).
This possibly explains why more recent survey-based approaches have exam-
ined HMP by looking at people’s perceptions of how biased the media generally 
are, irrespectively of their actual slant (Barnidge and Rojas, 2014; Eveland and 
Shah, 2003; Rojas, 2010). After all, as Gunther and Christen (2002) put it, they 
can perceive the media as being unfriendly or unfavorable relative to their polit-
ical rivals, even when they are being exposed to like-minded sources of political 
information. Perceptions of media bias may or may not mirror actual biases and 
merely lie in the eye of the beholder.
Other studies have estimated HMP by measuring the distance between per-
sonal viewpoints and the perceived ideology of the media one frequently uses. 
This approach comes closer to original studies on media perception in the exper-
imental tradition insofar as the studies rely on the media that people are actually 
exposed to, in contrast to perceptions on the media in general. It also presumably 
holds higher levels of external validity since it builds on media one frequently 
uses (Bachl, 2016; Gunther, 1992).
Inspired by the survey-based and experimental traditions outlined above, in 
this study we conceptualize hostile media perceptions (or hostile media bias per-
ceptions)1 as “phenomena in which people perceive media as biased against their 
point of view” (Barnidge and Rojas, 2014, p. 137), irrespective of how balanced 
the actual media coverage is. To operationalize hostile media perceptions, we 
also consider the “perceived ideological distance between the self and the media” 
(Barnidge and Rojas, 2014, p. 138; see also Rojas; 2010, Wojcieszak, 2010) people 
frequently select and use. Therefore, our approach is not only more generalizable 
than experimental research using forced conditions, but may also hold higher 
levels of internal validity than survey-based studies using people’s perceptions of 
media in general since it relies on media outlets respondents are actually exposed 
to on a frequent basis (Bachl, 2016).
In this vein, several other studies posit or show that perceptions can differ 
across media types, their reach, or their level of partisanship (Arpan and Raney, 
2003; Gunther and Liebhart, 2006; Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, and Chia, 2001; 
Hansen and Kim, 2011).
Much less has been contended on how the nature of people’s political dis-
cussions shape individual levels of hostility towards the media. Indeed, previ-
1 Hostile media perceptions and hostile media bias perceptions are used interchageably through-
out this article (see Bachl, 2016; Eveland and Shah, 2003; Huge and Glynn, 2010 for studies also 
using perceived media bias, perception of hostile media coverage, hostile media phenomenon, and 
hostile media effect interchangeably).
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ous research demonstrates that people tend to rely on their close surroundings 
and most trusted others to acquire and process political information (Chaffee 
and Mutz, 1988; Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe, 2009; Robinson, 1976). From that 
it follows that the way one perceives news media messages depends to a great 
extent on how they are adopted by one’s interpersonal encounters (Hardy and 
Scheufele, 2005). As Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain (2017) posit, discuss-
ing politics with fellow partisans can dramatically moderate effects of partisan 
media messages, making such messages more or less persuasive.
Despite the ability of social environments to shape people’s processing and 
understanding of mediated information, previous studies have largely neglected 
the role of interpersonal communication on hostile media bias perceptions. Nev-
ertheless, we have good reasons to believe that people with whom they frequently 
discuss politics play an important role for their predisposition to perceive the 
media as hostile.
Being engaged in homogeneous, or safe, political discussions has been asso-
ciated with perceived media bias against one’s own views (Eveland and Shah, 
2003). What can explain such a relationship? People actually encounter more 
diverse views through the media than through their social interactions (Chaffee, 
1982; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Mutz and Martin, 2001), whose conflicting 
viewpoints can drive social discomfort (Huckfeldt et al., 2004) and a fear of taking 
sides because of social accountability pressures (e.  g., Mutz, 2002). Perhaps more 
importantly, people tend to overestimate the level of agreement within their net-
works and underestimate the level of agreement with their frequent media diets 
(Mutz and Martin, 2001). This so-called false consensus effect or distortion (Ross, 
Greene, and House, 1977) that makes people amplify the commonness of one’s 
and others’ viewpoints increases the gap between perceived ideological close-
ness in interpersonal communication as compared to mediated communication. 
Moreover, people surrounded by like-minded others tend to be less tolerant of 
divergent viewpoints (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002). Homophily in political discus-
sions reinforces attitudes and makes individuals perceive that something impor-
tant is at stake and to be preserved. That individuals’ social contexts are highly 
homogeneous and cross-cutting, or non-like-minded views less tolerable, can in 
turn make people feel “strangely divorced” from the outside world (Huckfeldt et 
al., 2004, p.  29). All in all, individuals in homogeneous networks are likely to 
perceive any dissonant or dissenting argument as greatly distant, foreign, and 
hostile. Therefore, we expect to find that:
H1: Hostile media perceptions are stronger among those embedded in like-minded, or safe, 
discussions.
6   Laia Castro, David Nicolas Hopmann and Lilach Nir
By the same token, perceptions of hostile bias should be higher among strong 
partisans (Eveland and Shah, 2003; Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1994). Previous 
research attests to the assumption that those who hold higher levels of attitude 
extremity and ideological or partisan strength, irrespective of the direction, tend 
to perceive news media as hostile (Arlt et al., 2019; Hwang et al., 2008; Matthes, 
2013; but see mixed evidence in Gunther and Christen, 2002). As the prior attitude 
effect hypothesis posits (Taber and Lodge, 2006), people have difficulties to put 
aside “their prior feelings and prejudices when evaluating evidence, even when 
pro and con arguments have been presented to them in a balanced manner” 
(p. 760). In this vein, strong partisans are more likely to categorize information 
as opposed to their own views (Hansen and Kim, 2011; Vallone et al., 1985) and 
judge political information more defensively. Partisans are also particularly con-
cerned about others’ opinions and fear that biased information decisively affects 
less informed, vulnerable, or neutral audiences (Gunther and Liebhart, 2006). As 
Gunther and Storey (2003) showed, presumed media influence on others ampli-
fies hostile media perceptions. Also, those with a strong in-group identification 
(attachment and sense of belonging to a group that is believed to hold homo-
geneous views) experience stronger hostile media perceptions. The impact of 
strong attachment to a group is even amplified when they sense their group has 
“a lower status in society than the out-group” (Hartmann and Tanis, 2013, p. 543). 
Overall, we expect to find higher levels of hostile media perceptions among indi-
viduals exposed to homogeneous political discussions, and, in particular, among 
strongly partisan individuals embedded in like-minded networks reinforcing 
their existing views.
Hence, we anticipate that:
H2: The more partisan individuals are, the higher their likelihood to experience hostile 
media perceptions.
H3: Hostile media perceptions are stronger among more partisan individuals who have safe 
political discussions.
Previous literature provided mixed or inconclusive evidence on whether the 
direction of the ideological leaning makes an individual more or less likely to 
experience hostile media perceptions. Eveland and Shah (2003) showed that US 
Republicans are more likely to experience hostile media perceptions than Dem-
ocrats. The authors contended that their findings can be explained by a particu-
lar climate of opinion in the US: an across-the-board perception of liberal media 
bias among the political establishment and US journalists. Indeed, when people 
believe that particular groups or institutions are ideologically distant, they also 
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tend to believe these institutions are more biased. This mechanism has been 
shown to be salient among Israeli undergrad students, for example, who per-
ceive their professors are more left-leaning than themselves because of a wide-
spread belief that academic instructors are predominantly leftist (Yair and Sulitz-
eanu-Kenan, 2015).
However, other studies in political psychology showed that, in general, being 
extreme rightist is negatively correlated to cognitive complexity (Sidanius, 1985). 
On average leftists are more often critical thinkers, and have a greater need for 
cognition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003). This would explain why 
left-leaners tend to have more politically diverse media diets (Mutz and Martin, 
2001), which in turn may be conducive to a greater perception that media voice 
hostile political views. Furthermore, the social networks of leftists may also be 
more politically heterogeneous, since those individuals with greater need for 
cognition tend to value expertise rather than safeness when choosing their polit-
ical discussants (Huckfeldt, 2001). Being surrounded by experts increases the 
influence of political discussions (Huckfeldt, 2001), which may, in turn, decrease 
ideological gaps between one’s social networks and media diets, and perceived 
views of hostile media. We therefore make no strong prediction of the effects of 
individual ideology and formulate the following research question:
RQ1: Are left- or right-wing individuals more prone to hostile media perceptions?
3  Method
To test our hypotheses, we relied on data from the German Longitudinal Election 
Study (GLES) 2013 (N= 5,353). Survey data have been used in the past to investigate 
individual media bias effects (e.  g., Tsfati, 2007) and potential implications of het-
erogeneity in political discussion networks (e.  g., Eveland and Hively, 2009). Data 
on a national representative sample were collected between August and Novem-
ber 2013. Data collection was done via CATI. The response rate for the pre-elec-
tion wave was 15.8 %, that for the post-election wave, 67.9 %.2 In our analyses, 
we used ordered logistic regression models with hostile media bias perceptions 
as dependent variable and individual (strength of party identification, ideology) 
and situational factors (safety of political discussions) as well as several cross-
level interactions (ideology and strength of party identification with safe/danger-
ous/neutral discussions) as main independent variables of theoretical interest.
2 For further details on question wording and coding, see Rattinger et al., 2014.
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Hostile media perceptions were assessed using two survey items. We used 
questions tapping the party preference of each individual and the perceived party 
bias of each news outlet this individual watched/read at least once a week (see 
Bachl, 2016 or Barnidge and Rojas (2014) for similar approaches). We first coded 
each individual’s party preference and labeled each party as leftist or rightist 
based on public perceptions of that party’s ideology. Second, we considered (up 
to) three parties an individual perceived were being favored by each of their fre-
quently used media outlets and computed an average perceived ideology for each 
outlet on a 3-point scale (rightist, leftist, or neutral). Third, we averaged each 
individual’s media bias perceptions by the number of media outlets she or he 
used at least once a week. Fourth and last, we created a variable where a value 
of –1 was assigned to those who perceived their frequent media diet as close to 
their political camp (either left or right), 0 to those who perceived it as neutral, 
and 1 to those who perceived it as favoring the opposing political camp (M=0.06, 
SD=0.53) (see Guess and Coppock, 2018 for analogous scaling applied to the 
measurement of exposure to counter-attitudinal information). A more succinct 
description of the operationalization of this variable is shown in Table 1, and a toy 
example is provided in the Appendix.
Table 1: Hostile media perception scores.
Homogeneity in political discussions was constructed from three items that asked 
each respondent about their party preference, with whom they discussed most 
about politics, and which party they thought this person would vote for in the 
following federal election. Each respondent’s main discussants were coded as 
leftist, rightist, or neutral based on their voting intention. We then created three 
variables accounting for the absolute difference between each respondent and 
the average party support of their two main discussants, which we labeled “safe”, 
“dangerous”, and “neutral” political discussions. Answers ranged from 0 to 1 
(M=0.39, SD=0.42). We accounted for political discussions with a relatively small 
discussant network since GLES asked a series of questions on frequency of polit-
ical talk and perceived vote preference of two main discussants. This approach 
differs from other standards and survey items asking respondents to name up to 
four discussants (e.  g., 2000 ANES). Whereas one could argue that political talk 
with a lower number of discussants may be a measure of close-tie political discus-
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sions, a closer look at a GLES question tapping the degree of closeness to people’s 
frequent political discussants reveals a great deal of variation in the respondents’ 
distribution. As an example, more than 40 % of respondents reported discussing 
politics with people other than their spouse/partner or a relative for the first dis-
cussant, and nearly 50 % for the second discussant.
Strength of party identification was measured by asking participants how 
strongly they were inclined to support their preferred party (M=2.47, SD=1.87). 
Responses were coded on a scale from 0 to 5 (where 0=no party identification, 
5=very strong party identification). Political ideology was constructed from an 
item that measured the participants’ self-reported ideology on a left-right scale 
from 1 to 11 (higher=right) (M=4.35, SD=2.2).
In addition, we considered further individual differences in our analyses. 
Previous research shows those more politically interested, knowledgeable, and 
mobilized seek out ideologically diverse media information (Garrett, 2009) and 
tend to experience hostile bias perceptions in greater numbers (Rojas, 2010). We 
therefore controlled for political sophistication, which was a combined measure 
of political knowledge and political interest, operationalized from an item that 
probed “Which of the two votes is decisive for the relative strengths of the parties 
in the Bundestag?” and another one probing “How interested in politics are you?” 
(0=not at all to 4=very interested; M=3.04, SD=1.19), respectively (see De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden, 2006 for a similar approach).
We accounted for levels of self-reported media attention when watching TV 
news and reading political information, since Dalton et al. (1998) find hostile 
media bias perceptions to be higher among those who paid less attention to (the 
1992 US presidential) election news coverage. Habitual media attention was con-
structed as an index by averaging two items, attention to news on television and 
newspapers; responses were 1=very carefully, 2=carefully, 3=not so carefully, 
4=not carefully at all (M=1.67, SD=0.68). Responses were re-coded to an inverted 
index, with higher scores reflecting stronger media attention to news. Additional 
socio-demographics such as gender (51.42 % of respondents were female), edu-
cation (1–5 scale; M=3.66, SD=1.19), and age (the average age was 53.3 years old) 
were included in our regression models as well.
We additionally examined the size of respondents’ political discussion net-
works since the likelihood to encounter disagreement in such networks increases 
with each additional discussant (Granovetter, 1973; Mutz and Mondak, 2006), 
which in turn may serve as a benchmark for individuals to assess like-mindedness 
in their media diets. Also, network size has been shown to have a positive rela-
tionship with other potential predictors of hostile media bias perceptions such 
as political engagement and knowledge (Eveland and Hively, 2009). Network size 
was measured by asking respondents how many people they talked to about pol-
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itics in an average week, on a range from 0 to 20 (M=2.77, SD=4.07). Frequency of 
political discussions was also considered by measuring how many days a week 
participants talked about politics with other people, where 0=0 days a week, 7=7 
days (M=1.57, SD=1.9). As with network size, engagement in political discussions 
is a frequent predictor of political learning, knowledge, and interest (Eveland, 
2004).
Additionally, we ran separate analyses for newspapers and TV since percep-
tions of media bias may vary from source to source. Previous research demon-
strates that newspapers hold higher levels of trust and credibility among the 
public than TV channels (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000). Previous literature also 
shows that German newspaper coverage is highly opinionated (Bachl, 2016), all 
of which can affect individuals’ media bias perceptions.
4  Results
Are safe discussion networks associated with hostile media bias perceptions? And 
can these safe networks affect perceived hostile media for ideologues on both 
sides? Table 2 shows four ordered logistic regression models (1a-d). We thereby 
tested whether being embedded in like-minded social networks (H1), being more 
partisan (H2) and leftist (RQ1), make individuals more likely to perceive hostile 
media bias and whether individual strength of party identification amplifies the 
impact of safe discussions on hostile media bias perceptions (H3).
Findings provide partial support for our hypotheses. Evidence of the role 
of discussing politics in safe or like-minded social settings was inconclusive, 
with some coefficients showing hostile effects (H1), whereas others coefficients 
showing the opposite trend for different levels of the other component variables 
in the interaction terms. Strength of party identification positively correlated with 
hostile media bias perceptions across 1a-d. We found no support for H3 that there 
is an interaction between partisanship and safe discussions (Model 1c). That is, 
individual partisanship strength does not amplify the impact of like-minded dis-
cussions on hostile media perceptions, as the literature underpinning H3 sug-
gests.
By contrast, all models without exception showed that being a leftist increases 
one’s likelihood to perceive media as hostile (RQ1). Indeed, we found hostile bias 
perceptions to hold the strongest correlations with ideology3. As an example, a 
3 As robustness checks, we ran additional analyses (not shown) with a further measure account-
ing for the left-right leaning of each respondent’s preferred party (vote to leftist/rightist party). 
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one-unit shift to the left of the ideological scale resulted in a 1.28 increase in the 
ordered log-odds of experiencing high levels of hostile media bias perceptions, 
holding the other variables constant at their means. Put differently, for a one-unit 
decrease on the left-right scale, the odds of experiencing high as compared to 
low levels of hostile perceptions are .88 times greater, holding the other variables 
constant. Interestingly, we also found that extreme leftists experience a higher 
degree of hostile media bias perceptions when surrounded by like-minded others 
in political discussions (see Figure 1 and Model 1b in Table 2).
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between discussion safety and hostile 
media bias perceptions among individuals with different left-right ideological 
positions. The figure shows a decrease in the marginal effect of engagement in 
safe discussions on perceptions of hostile bias the more right-of-center an indi-
vidual is. The effect of discussion safety on hostile media perceptions is 8 % 
higher for individuals who score 0 in the left-right scale (extreme leftists) and 
decreases to 3 % for those who score 4 (relative to those scoring 3). The effect 
remains non-significant and invariant for individuals who place themselves on 
Results with this variable confirm patterns found in models 1a to 1d, namely: voting for a left-
ist party significantly increases one’s likelihood to perceive media as hostile; strength of party 
identification positively correlates with hostile media perceptions (although non-significantly); 
no support for an effect of like-minded discussions among strong partisans on perceived media 
bias.
Table 2: Prediction of hostile media bias perceptions.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d
Variable b/se b/se b/se b/se
Ideology (Right) -1.28***(.02) -.09***(.02) -.13***(.02) -.13***(.02)
Party ID strength .07**(.03) .07**(.03) .07*(.03) .07**(.03)
Political sophistication .09*(.04) .09*(.04) .09*(.04) -.01(.05)
News media attention .16**(.06) .16**(.06) .16**(.06) .16**(.06)
Female .08(.07) .08(.07) .08(.07) .08(.07)
Education -.03(.03) -.03(.03) -.03(.03) -.03(.03)
Age .01***(.00) .01***(.00) .01***(.03) .01***(.00)
Frequency of pol discussions .02(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02) .02(.02)
Network size .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01)
Discussion safety .11(.11) .40*(.19) .03(.34) -.87**(.28)
Discussion danger .16(.14) .16(.14) .16(.15) .18(.14)
Discussion safety*ideology -.07#(.04)
Discussion safety*party strength .02(.34)
Discussion safety*pol sophistication .29***(.08)
threshold(1) -1.24(.23) -1.11(.24) -1.25(.23) -1.57(.25)
threshold(2) 2.15(.23) 2.28(.24) 2.15(.24) 1.83(.25)
N 3849 3849 3849 3849
chi2/df/p 162.36/12/.00 165.97/13/.00 162.42/13/.00 176.81/13/.00
McFadden's pseudo R2 .025 .025 .025 .027
Note: Ordered logit regression coefficients. Day of interview is included in all models. #p<0.10 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001.
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more rightist positions on the left-right spectrum (results not shown, available 
from authors).
Additionally, political sophistication is positively linked to hostile media 
bias perceptions in three of four models. Perhaps most interestingly, we found 
evidence that holding high levels of political interest and knowledge (political 
sophistication) and being in congruent social networks encourages perceptions of 
hostile media bias. Figure 2 in the Appendix shows the relationship between dis-
cussion safety and hostile media bias perceptions by different levels of political 
sophistication. Safe discussions play a significant role in explaining hostile per-
ceptions for those with the highest and lowest scores in sophistication. The effect 
of safe discussions on hostile perceptions is positive and significant for high levels 
of political sophistication. For those scoring low, the effect is negative and signif-
icant. The implications of these findings are discussed in the concluding section.
The inclusion of further situational variables accounting for the role of polit-
ical discussions for our analyses yielded mixed results. Size of discussion net-
works, or frequency with which individuals engage in political discussions, have 
no impact on bias perceptions. Additionally, we found that news media attention 
and age significantly predict hostile media bias perceptions.
Figure 1: Average marginal effects of the safety of political discussions on hostile media bias  
perceptions, by left-right self-placement (10=Right).
Note: Effect sizes on hostile perceptions for each point in the left-right scale with 95 % CI.
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We also distinguished between media sources and ran separate analyses for 
newspapers and TV news, since perceptions of bias may vary from one medium to 
the other (Bachl, 2016; Flanagin and Metzger, 2000). Results of a t-test comparing 
average levels of hostile bias perceptions in newspapers and TV news bulletins 
revealed no statistically significant differences between sources. We also com-
pared the results of our regression models on hostile media bias perceptions sep-
arately for each medium. The effects of network safety and ideological leaning on 
hostile bias perceptions were not substantially different for newspaper as com-
pared to TV news exposure.
5  Discussion
Previous research has established the contribution of hostile media bias percep-
tions to the willingness to engage in political discussions (Barnidge and Rojas, 
2014; Hart, Feldman, Leiserowitz, and Maibach, 2015), to speak up (Hwang et 
al., 2008), or to increased political action (Borah, Thorson, and Hwang, 2015). 
However, since Eveland and Shah (2003) published their study on the impact of 
interpersonal communication on perceived media bias in the US, little has been 
investigated about social environments as antecedents of hostile media effects 
(Perloff, 2015).
In this study, we aimed to fill the void by investigating the extent to which 
engaging in safe, or like-minded, political discussions makes individuals more 
or less likely to perceive a hostile media bias. Previous research has shown that 
pretty much every aspect of citizens’ political attitudes, behavior, and knowledge 
is heavily influenced by social environments (for overviews, see, e.  g., Huckfeldt, 
2007; Schmitt-Beck and Lup, 2013) and, hence, there is no reason to assume 
that media bias perceptions would not be. We considered attitudes (strength of 
party identification, ideology) and discussion agreement as well as other factors 
(political sophistication, network size, frequency of political discussion) with the 
potential to explain how citizens process and understand political information 
via the media, thereby going beyond previous studies that only take into account 
individual-level explanations (Matthes, 2013; Oh, Park, and Wanta, 2011). We also 
made use of data on the perceived party preference of outlets, which provides 
sources’ general ideological outlook and is less context-sensitive than previous 
approaches relying on issue position (Hartman and Tanis, 2013; Wojcieszak, 
2017).
Whereas talking politics with like-minded others does not seem to have an 
across-the-board effect on hostile media perceptions, our results show that polit-
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ically homogeneous discussions may be linked to hostility towards the media 
among those more partisan and to the left of the political spectrum. Our find-
ings show that those more leftist, partisan, and politically sophisticated are more 
likely to experience hostile media effects; most importantly for the purpose of this 
study, being in like-minded social settings makes (extreme) leftists and also polit-
ically knowledgeable and interested individuals more prone to perceive media as 
hostile.
The results have various theoretical implications and point at two promis-
ing avenues for future study. Firstly, diverging from previous findings in the US 
we show that respondents in like-minded political discussions are more likely to 
experience media as biased against their views the more to the left they are on 
the political spectrum. We used data collected in Germany during the 2013 federal 
election campaign. Until then, the conservative CDU/CSU were in office, in coali-
tion with the FDP. Scholars have lengthily discussed whether hostile media bias 
is a result of self-categorization processes, previous negative beliefs about media, 
and ideological predispositions (as posited by Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1994; 
Kim, 2016; Reid, 2012; Vallone et al., 1985) or instead mirrors actual biases in 
media’s provision of political information (as shown by Arceneaux, Johnson, and 
Murphy, 2012; Coe et al., 2008). Against this background, the question arises as to 
whether our findings are the product of leftists’ individual idiosyncrasies that are 
conducive to hostile media effects (strong need for cognition, critical thinking), 
as argued above. This thesis is supported by the fact that those GLES respondents 
scoring high in political sophistication, and, by extension, more prone to have 
ideologically diverse media diets and engage in defensive processing (Castro, Nir 
and Skovsgaard, 2018; Rojas, 2010; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992) were also 
found to experience high levels of hostile media perceptions when embedded in 
like-minded discussions. Alternatively, results may be due to a journalistic tradi-
tion that grants information bonuses to political incumbents (see, for the German 
case, Schönbach and Semetko, 2000; Schönbach, Ridder, and Lauf, 2001). The 
possibility of actual biases is also supported by the fact that those scoring low in 
political sophistication (and least likely to be exposed to political information) 
are also less hostile toward the media or, more directly, by the positive relation-
ship between individual media attention and perceived hostile media bias found 
in our analyses. Further longitudinal and cross-national studies using survey and 
media content data are nevertheless needed to confirm whether, as with German 
media incumbency bonuses or with US public perceptions of liberal bias, specific 
contextual variables may be also at play, above and beyond individual predispo-
sitions and interpersonal factors.
Secondly, future cross-national approaches may also help to discern spill-
overs from interpersonal communication to perceptions of media bias in a 
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more precise way. Should we expect homogeneous social networks to have the 
same impact everywhere? Once again, our results differed from those in the US, 
where like-minded social environments alone seem to play a significant role in 
increasing hostile bias perceptions. This discrepancy can be simply due to the 
use of different approaches to operationalize hostile media bias perceptions. For 
example, whereas we relied on a survey item that measured subjective percep-
tions of bias in frequently used particular media outlets, Eveland and Shah (2003) 
used an item tapping the extent to which individuals believed most news media 
in the US were biased against their own viewpoints.4 By capitalizing on country 
differences, however, future analyses could offer more substantial and theoreti-
cally-grounded explanations of the variability in hostile media bias effects. For 
instance, future research may uncover the extent to which different levels of 
media and political segmentation across countries (higher vs. lower diversity of 
media platforms, power-concentrating/majoritarian vs. power-sharing political 
systems with proportional representation) can make citizens more or less familiar 
with (and by extension sensitive to) non-like-minded, or cross-cutting, political 
views.
The current study is not without limitations. The most obvious caveat follows 
from the use of cross-sectional data. Though previous studies on political dis-
cussion networks and hostile media bias perceptions have similarly employed 
survey data from one country at one point in time (Eveland and Hively, 2009; 
Tsfati, 2007), our methodological approach advises caution regarding causality 
claims. Further experimental research might complement our study and explain 
differences in perceptions on media content, albeit previous meta-analyses 
showed that surveys present more consistent results than experiments (Hansen 
and Kim, 2011; Savage, 2004).
Second, from our results no inference can be made on perceptions of media 
bias among individuals discussing politics online. Due to data availability con-
straints, we could only consider political exchanges within offline discussions 
4 Our results might have been more compelling had we had taken into account either people’s 
perceptions on the media as a whole or outlets they do not normally use. However, our approach 
goes in line with previous experimental and survey research that tests levels of hostility towards 
content that individuals have actually been exposed to (e.  g., Vallone et al., 1985) and considers 
perceived media hostility as “perceived ideological distance between the self and the media” 
(Barnidge and Rojas, 2014, p. 138; see also Rojas, 2010; Wojcieszak, 2010). The generalizability 
of our results is also greater than other survey-based studies since we use people’s perceptions 
on media outlets they frequently select and use. This is also important in analyzing effects of 
hostile media perceptions. Gauging individuals’ perceptions of bias on their frequent media diet 
may also contribute to better explaining the impact of such perceptions on their attitudes and 
behaviors.
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with up to two discussants (see Footnote 2 for a more detailed account of the 
nature of such discussions as found in GLES data). Recent research shows that 
reliance on social media for news exacerbates perceptions of media bias (Rojas, 
Barnidge, and Abril, 2016). Further research needs to tap into dynamics of media 
bias perceptions among people discussing politics in social media, since these 
platforms offer greater opportunities to self-select but also fewer chances to avoid 
potentially hostile political views (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, and Bonneau, 
2015; Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016); allow citizens to rely on broader networks 
of experts and political junkies; facilitate heated and even uncivil political dis-
cussions with non-likeminded others (Theocharis, Barberá, Fazekas, Popa, and 
Parnet, 2016); or are catalyzers of perceptions of media hostility by connecting 
candidates (and their negative and emotional campaigning) with their enthused 
partisan, and/or angry supporters in more direct ways (Weeks et al., 2019, p. 379).
Finally, we could not discern the effects of different intensities in political 
ideology of individuals’ discussion peers. In this vein, the extent to which indi-
viduals are in contact with moderate or extreme leftist or rightist individuals 
may moderate or amplify the impact of homogeneous social networks on hostile 
media bias perceptions. For example, Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) 
model posits that an extremely liberal/conservative individual who encounters 
moderate liberal/conservative political views may experience “attitude moder-
ation” (Prior, 2013, p. 8), which in turn may downplay perceived hostile media 
bias. Future studies should account for such nuances. Overall, we believe our 
findings, albeit context-dependent, contribute to shedding light on the under-re-
searched domain of the social antecedents of hostile media bias perceptions.
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Appendix
Figure 2: Average marginal effects of safety of political discussions on hostile media bias  
perceptions, by levels of political sophistication.
Note: Effect sizes on hostile media perceptions for each level of sophistication with 95 % CI.
Question wording and coding of variables
Hostile media bias perceptions
Many people in Germany are inclined to support a particular political party for a 
longer period of time even if they occasionally vote for another party. What about 
you? In general terms, are you inclined to support a particular political party? 
And if so, which one?
(If BILD is read at least once a week) If you think about the reports on political 
parties in BILD during the election campaign, which impression did you have? 
Were these reports more favorable to some parties than to others? If yes, to which 
parties? (up to 3 parties in the order mentioned)
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(If outlet read/watched at least once a week) If you think about the reports 
in this newspaper on/coverage in these programs of the political parties during 
the election campaign, which impression did you have? Were these reports more 
favorable to some parties than to others? If so, to which parties?
Ideology
Do you see yourself as a rather left-wing or a rather right-wing person? Please use 
a scale from 1 to 11. If 1 is “left” and 11 is “right”, where do you see yourself?
Strength of party identification
(If inclined to support a particular party) How strongly or little are you inclined to 
support this party: very strongly, fairly strongly, moderately, fairly little, or very 
little? (re-coded 0=no party ID, 6=very strong party ID)
Political sophistication (additive index of knowledge and 
interest)
In the federal election, you have two votes: the first vote and the second vote. 
Which one of the two is decisive for the relative strengths of the parties in the 
Bundestag?
1–3 multiple choice with one-true option and DK. Correct answer 1 point)
Generally, how interested in politics are you? 5-point scale
News media attention
(If TV was watched on at least one day) When you were watching the news on 
television, how carefully did you watch the reports on the political parties and 
the election campaign – very carefully, carefully, not so carefully, or not carefully 
at all? 4-point inverted scale, reverse-coded
(If newspaper read at least one day) How carefully did you read reports on the 
parties and the election campaign – very carefully, carefully, not so carefully, or 
not carefully at all? 4-point scale, reverse-coded
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Frequency of political discussions
On how many days last week did you talk about politics and the political parties 
with other people, such as members of your family, friends, or acquaintances? (0–7)
Network size
(If person discussed politics 1–7) What would you say, what was the number of 
persons with whom you talked about politics? 0=no discussions, 21=more than 
20 persons
Discussion safety/danger:
Are you inclined to support a particular political party? And if so, which one?
On how many days last week did you talk to this person (first discussion 
partner/second discussion partner) about parties or the federal election? (0–7)
Which party do you think this person (first discussion partner/second discus-
sion partner) will probably vote for in the federal election on 22 September, or do 
you think she/he will not vote at all?
Example of how hostile media perceptions  
(or HMP) is constructed
To illustrate the computation of hostile media bias perceptions (or HMP), two 
hypothetical individuals (individual x and individual y) will be used as examples. 
Individual x is an SPD-supporter, who reads Bild and watches ZDF, and individual 
y is a CDU/CSU supporter, who also reads Bild and watches ZDF. Both individual 
x and individual y perceive Bild and ZDF to lean towards CDU/CSU. Accordingly, 
we first assign a left=1 to individual x since she/he votes SPD and assign a right=1 
to individual y since she/he votes CDU/CSU. Second, we compute an average per-
ceived ideology of each individual’s media diet on a 3-point scale where 1=leftist, 
2=neutral, 3=rightist. As both individual x and individual y perceive the media 
outlets they use as favoring CDU/CSU, each of these individuals’ perceived media 
ideology scores 3. Third and last, an HMP value of 1 is assigned to individual x, 
who voted for a leftist party (SPD) and perceived her media diet as favoring the 
opposing political camp (CDU/CSU or right), and an HMP value of –1 is assigned 
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to individual y, since she/he voted for a rightist party and perceived her frequent 
media diet as close to her political camp (right).
